Risk-Adjusted Performance and Bank Governance Structures

These four essays investigate the impact of bank governance structures on performance, risk, and stability. The first three studies analyze financial expertise of supervisory board members as a governance instrument, while the last study addresses the impact of ownership concentration on banks' performance, risk, and stability on a global level.

This dissertation comprises four essays investigating the impact of bank governance structures on performance, risk, and stability. The first three studies analyze financial expertise of supervisory board members as a governance instrument: The first study focuses on the extent to which supervisory board members may be regarded as financially literate. The second study places emphasis on the impact of expertise on performance, risk, and stability at German savings banks, while the third study comprises the comparison of the mentioned impact at savings and cooperative banks. Finally, the fourth study analyzes the impact of ownership concentration on banks' performance, risk, and stability on a global level.

Autorentext

Christoph Böhm studied business administration at the University of Mannheim. He earned his doctorate at the Chair of Corporate Finance at the Technische Universität Darmstadt. During his research period he worked for a management consulting company. His current place of employment is with a global reinsurance company.

Inhalt

Contents: The Evident Banking Expertise of Supervisory Board Members of German Cooperative and Savings Banks Financial Expertise in Supervisory Boards, Bank Performance and Risk-Taking: Evidence from German Savings Banks Financial Expertise of Supervisory Boards Members, Overconfidence, and Bank Risk-Taking Bank Performance and Risk: Contest of the Risk Advocate Hypothesis.