Russell s Theory of Meaning

This book explores Russell s motivation to develop a theory of meaning in logic and language. His philosophy of logical atomism is s a complex account of logic, language, metaphysics, and epistemology where the discussion focuses on his linguistic revolution. He accepts Frege s notion of reference but criticises Frege s account of sense. His obsession with the naming relation leads him towards a traditional empiricism and raises some important questions about the role of names and descriptions in natural language. Dummett thinks that Russell s adherence to traditional metaphysics and epistemology can be resolved when an adequate theory of meaning can be provided. Kripke argues that Russell s identification of ordinary proper names as descriptions is wrong. Sainsbury, Evans, and Peacocke being critical of Russell s views, think that Russell s account of meaning can be rescued. Evans, Millican, and McCulloch are particularly concerned with the contrast between a semantic and a pragmatic use of language. Russell s overall view attempts to show that his account of a perfect language has some implication for understanding the analysis of expressions in natural language.

Autorentext

Nayeema Haque is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Her works include essays on Russell and Wittgenstein and also on Human Rights and Gender Studies.

Klappentext

This book explores Russell s motivation to develop a theory of meaning in logic and language. His philosophy of logical atomism is s a complex account of logic, language, metaphysics, and epistemology where the discussion focuses on his linguistic revolution. He accepts Frege s notion of reference but criticises Frege s account of sense. His obsession with the naming relation leads him towards a traditional empiricism and raises some important questions about the role of names and descriptions in natural language. Dummett thinks that Russell s adherence to traditional metaphysics and epistemology can be resolved when an adequate theory of meaning can be provided. Kripke argues that Russell s identification of ordinary proper names as descriptions is wrong. Sainsbury, Evans, and Peacocke being critical of Russell s views, think that Russell s account of meaning can be rescued. Evans, Millican, and McCulloch are particularly concerned with the contrast between a semantic and a pragmatic use of language. Russell s overall view attempts to show that his account of a perfect language has some implication for understanding the analysis of expressions in natural language.