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Self-Indication Assumption Doomsday Argument Rebuttal
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High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! The Self-Indication Assumption Doomsday argument rebuttal is an objection to the Doomsday argument (that there is only a 5% chance of more than twenty times the historic number of humans ever being born) by arguing that the chance of being born is not one, but is an increasing function of the number of people who will be born. This objection to the Doomsday Argument (DA), originally by Dennis Dieks (1992), developed by Bartha & Hitchcock (1999), and expanded by Ken Olum (2001), is that the possibility of you existing at all depends on how many humans will ever exist (N). If N is big, then the chance of you existing is higher than if only a few humans will ever exist. Since you do indeed exist, this is evidence that N is high. The argument is sometimes expressed in an alternative way by having the posterior marginal distribution of n based on N without explicitly invoking a non-zero chance of existing. The Bayesian inference mathematics are identical.
Weitere Informationen
- Allgemeine Informationen
- GTIN 09786131163180
- Editor Lambert M. Surhone, Miriam T. Timpledon, Susan F. Marseken
- EAN 9786131163180
- Format Fachbuch
- Titel Self-Indication Assumption Doomsday Argument Rebuttal
- Herausgeber Betascript Publishing
- Anzahl Seiten 92
- Genre Mathematik
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