Social Agency and Practical Reasons

A critical examination of contributions by Anscombe, Lewis, Gilbert and Bratman to the analyses of promises, reciprocity and trust is developed into a constructive account of social agency and practical rationality in the tradition of ordinary language philosophy.

Tying in with major traditions of ordinary language philosophy, the author presents an account of practical reasons in social agency that radically challenges the two mainstream accounts of practical reasons, the desire-belief model and the neo-Aristotelian «sub-specie-boni» model of practical reasons. She argues that the traditional focus on instrumental rationality and teleological reasoning ignores important types of non-purposive and agent-related reasons that play a major role in rule-based context of social agency and reciprocal interaction. The argument contributes to the analysis of promising and social conventions, reconstructions of acting together and shared intentions, and develops a new account of institutional and rule-based agency in terms of non-moral normativity.

Autorentext

Christine Chwaszcza is Professor of Political Philosophy, Social and Legal Philosophy at the University of Cologne. Previous publications include contributions to the Ethics of International Relations, Human Rights, Philosophy of Action and Practical Reasons.

Inhalt

Practical reasons in social agency as non-purposive Limitations of instrumental rationality and means-end reasoning in social agency Constructive criticism of neo-Aristotelian account of practical knowledge Rationality of reciprocity Reasons to trust Practice account of promising.