Strategy and Game Theory

This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. The text initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for masters level courses. The first six chapters cover complete-information games, separately analyzing simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, with applications in industrial economics, law, and regulation. Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students' attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. This text is appropriate for introductory-to-intermediate courses in game theory at the upper undergraduate and master's level.

Autorentext
Felix Muñoz-Garcia *is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University. His research focuses on the areas of microeconomics, industrial organization, and game theory, with applications to environmental regulation under incomplete information and firms' entry-deterring practices in polluting industries. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2008. He has published in the Canadian Journal of Economics, Theory and Decision, Journal of Regulatory Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, and Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, among others.
Daniel Toro-González* is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic and Business at Universidad Tecnologica de Bolivar. His research is in industrial organization and econometrics, with applications to technology adoption, transportation, and the food industry. He receiveda Ph.D. in Economics from Washington State University in 2012. He has published in the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, and The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics*.

Inhalt

Chapter 1: Dominance Solvable Games.- Chapter 2: Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium and Simultaneous move games with complete information.- Chapter 3: Mixed Strategies, Strictly competitive games, and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 4: Sequential-move games with complete information.- Chapter 5: Applications to Industrial Organization.- Chapter 6: Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 7: Simultaneousmove games with Incomplete Information.- Chapter 8: Auctions.- Chapter 9: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling games.- Chapter 10: More advanced signaling games.