Subnational Authorities and the European Union

The European Union, as a regulatory polity based on integration through law, arguably relies more on legal compliance with its policies than any other political system. Proceeding from this point of departure, this book puts the spotlight on the subnational tier and scrutinizes its role in ensuring compliance. Drawing on a dataset of infringement proceedings against federal and regionalized member states, the book shows that strong shared rule, i.e., strong cooperation between national and subnational authorities, can improve national compliance records. In contrast, policy sectors with strong redistributive consequences impair subnational authorities' capacity to comply. In short, policy and politics matter more than polity.

Provides a new dataset on subnational compliance behavior into EU environmental politics Shifts the focus of existing compliance theories to the subnational level Presents an overarching conceptual framework to explain compliance in a multilevel system

Autorentext

Dr. Stephan Lutzenberger has been working as a researcher and lecturer at the Center for European Integration, part of the Otto-Suhr-Institut, Free University of Berlin, Germany.

Inhalt
Introduction: Noncompliance in a multilevel system.- Subnational authorities and compliance with EU legislation a conceptual framework.- Politics beats polity: Self-rule, shared rule, and member states' compliance.- Policy beats polity: Complexity, misfit, and subnational authorities' compliance.- Conclusion: The need for multilevel cooperation.