The Aftermath of Defeats in War

This book sets out to explain the variation in nations' reactions to their defeats in war. Typically, we observe two broad reactions to defeat: an inward-oriented response that accepts defeat as a reality and utilizes it as an opportunity for a new beginning, and an outward-oriented one that rejects defeat and invests national energies in restoring what was lostmost likely by force. This volume argues that although defeats in wars are humiliating experiences, those sentiments do not necessarily trigger aggressive nationalism, empower radical parties, and create revisionist foreign policy. Post-defeat, radicalization will be actualized only if it is filtered through three variables: national self-images (inflated or realistic), political parties (strong or weak), and international opportunities and constraints. The author tests this theory on four detailed case studies, Egypt (1967), Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Hungary and Bulgaria (WWI), and Islamic fundamentalism.

Provides a new theory of how defeats and sentiments of humiliation (combined with other factors) lead to either radicalization or political reforms Presents a comparative approach to the study of the aftermath of defeats in various countries and continents and timeframes Combines ideational and institutional variables, thus reconciling and synthesizing variables from institutional theory and social constructivism/identity theory

Autorentext
Ibrahim M. Zabad is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies program at St. Bonaventure University, USA.

Inhalt
1: Introduction and Theoretical Framework.- 2: Egypt: Defeat and the Transformation of State and Society.- 3: Bulgaria: Defeat and Nationalist Demobilization during the Peasant Era.- 4: Hungary: The Cult of Defeat.- 5: The Ottoman Empire/Turkey: Defeat and the Birth of a Nation.- 6: Defeats, Humiliation, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Political Violence.- 7: Conclusion.