The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis

The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis examines the external pressures vis-à -vis British economic policy that culminated in the 1976 UK-IMF crisis. The postwar development of IMF loan conditionality is reviewed as well as the growing incompatibility after 1974 between the Government's domestic political imperatives and Britain's external economic constraints that led to the crisis. More generally, the case study demonstrates the coercive and constraining nature of 'international cooperation' in contemporary international relations.

Autorentext

MARK D. HARMON

Inhalt
List of Tables and Figures - Preface and Acknowledgements - Sovereignty, Regimes and 'Cooperation' - IMF Conditionality and the United Kingdom, 1944-1970: 'My Appeal Was Essentially Based on Bogus Dignity' - New Directions for Labour, 1970-74: 'We Must in the Future Alter the Priorities in Favour of Economic Growth' - Burden-Sharing and Loosened Conditionality, 1974-75: 'The Nature of What Constitutes a Sustainable Balance of Payments Has Been Radically Changed' - Labour Economic Policy, March 1974-May 1975: 'A Phoney Phase' - Labour Economic Policy, June 1975-March 1976: 'We Knew We Were Riding a Crisis' - Burden-Shifting and Tightened Conditionality, 1975-76: 'The Practice of Financing the Status Quo is Coming to an End' - Currency Crisis and Restricted Policy Options, March-August 1976: Opening 'Pandora's Box' - Driven to the IMF, September-November 1976: 'The Market's Verdicts are Merciless and Effective' - Crisis Resolution, December 1976-January 1977: 'It is Mad But We Have No Alternative' - Conclusion - Bibliography - Index