The Ethics of Vulnerability

Gilson provides a systematic account of the ethics of vulnerability, critiquing the reductively negative view taken against vulnerability, demonstrating how its persistence prevents vulnerability from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have, and articulating instead a richer, more nuanced theory. She then applies this account to the debates over pornography in feminism, thus showing its value for fraught ethical and political issues.

Zusatztext "In this finely crafted analysis of vulnerability! Gilsonintegrates insights from philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze with the feminist analyses of Margaret Walker! Judith Butler! and Hélène Cixous to present a radical reinterpretation of the concept. Gilson's analysis displaces the many constricting dichotomies associated with the concept of vulnerability! such as weakness/strength! passivity/activity! dependence/independence! and femininity/masculinity. This revised account opens up possibilities of ethical response and social critique hitherto obscured. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through professionals/practitioners."--S. A. Mason! CHOICE Informationen zum Autor Erinn C. Gilson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida, USA. Her research focuses on ethics and social thought from a feminist perspective and informed by contemporary European philosophy. She is currently exploring issues surrounding food ethics and the question of the significance of ethical failure. Klappentext As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one's own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one's own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems. Zusammenfassung As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one's own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one's own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Part 1: The Norm...

"In this finely crafted analysis of vulnerability, Gilsonintegrates insights from philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze with the feminist analyses of Margaret Walker, Judith Butler, and Hélène Cixous to present a radical reinterpretation of the concept. Gilson's analysis displaces the many constricting dichotomies associated with the concept of vulnerability, such as weakness/strength, passivity/activity, dependence/independence, and femininity/masculinity. This revised account opens up possibilities of ethical response and social critique hitherto obscured. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through professionals/practitioners."--S. A. Mason, CHOICE

Autorentext

Erinn C. Gilson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida, USA. Her research focuses on ethics and social thought from a feminist perspective and informed by contemporary European philosophy. She is currently exploring issues surrounding food ethics and the question of the significance of ethical failure.

Klappentext

As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one's own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one's own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems.

Inhalt

Introduction Part 1: The Normative Significance of Vulnerability 1. Responsibility for the Vulnerable 2. Thinking Vulnerability with Judith Butler Part 2: Avoidance and Disavowal 3. The Ideal of an Invulnerability 4. Risk and Control: The Formation of Entrepreneurial Subjectivity Part 3: Rethinking Vulnerability 5. Vulnerability Beyond Opposition 6. Vulnerability in Social Life: Sexuality and Pornography Conclusion