The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in the European Monetary Union

Sebastian Dullien gives a novel explanation for unemployment and inflation in the Euro-Zone. He argues that unemployment stems from a lack of co-operation between unions and monetary authorities: In an economy with endogenous money as EMU, wage setters are responsible for price stability while the central bank is responsible for the level of output. Co-operation between both actors is necessary for high employment and low inflation. The current institutional set-up is found to be unable to assure cooperation.

Autorentext
SEBASTIAN DULLIEN is Economics Correspondent at the Financial Times Deutschland, the German language edition of the FT. Previously he worked as a short term expert for the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. He also teaches at the Freie Universität in Berlin.

Inhalt
Introduction: The Unsolved Unemployment-Inflation Puzzle Development of Literature on Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining European Empirics Problem with Standard Approaches: Criticising the Real Balance Effect Monetary Policy Transmission in a World of Endogenous Money Output and Prices in a World Without the Real Balance Effect The Central Bank: Restrictions in a World of Endogenous Money Optimal Policy Mix and Logic of a Social Pact Conclusion