The Notion of Ditthi in Theravada Buddhism

The notion of 'view' or 'opinion' (ditthi) as an obstacle to 'seeing things as they are' is a central concept in Buddhist thought. Through its argument this book makes a valuable addition to the study of Buddhist philosophy.

Zusatztext 'The authors immaculatereferences to primary sources and secondary literatureare well chosen and contain good pointers for reflection and stimulants for further research.' - JRAS! Series 3! Volume 16'This book is rich in content.' - Karel Werner! School of Oriental and African Studies! University of London Informationen zum Autor Paul Fuller is currently doing research for the University of Bristol, from which he has recently received his PhD. Klappentext The notion of 'view' or 'opinion' (ditthi) as an obstacle to 'seeing things as they are' is a central concept in Buddhist thought. This book considers the two ways in which the notion of views are usually understood. Are we to understand right-view as a correction of wrong-views (the opposition understanding) or is the aim of the Buddhist path the overcoming of all views, even right-view (the no-views understanding)? The author argues that neither approach is correct. Instead he suggests that the early texts do not understand right-view as a correction of wrong-view, but as a detached order of seeing, completely different from the attitude of holding to any view, wrong or right. Zusammenfassung The notion of 'view' or 'opinion' (ditthi) as an obstacle to 'seeing things as they are' is a central concept in Buddhist thought. Through its argument this book makes a valuable addition to the study of Buddhist philosophy. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction 2. The Content of Wrong-View 3. The Content of Right-View 4. The Way Wrong-View Functions 5. The Way Right-View Functions 6. The Transcendence of Views 7. Conclusion Appendices

Autorentext

Paul Fuller is currently doing research for the University of Bristol, from which he has recently received his PhD.

Klappentext

The notion of 'view' or 'opinion' (ditthi) as an obstacle to 'seeing things as they are' is a central concept in Buddhist thought. This book considers the two ways in which the notion of views are usually understood. Are we to understand right-view as a correction of wrong-views (the opposition understanding) or is the aim of the Buddhist path the overcoming of all views, even right-view (the no-views understanding)? The author argues that neither approach is correct. Instead he suggests that the early texts do not understand right-view as a correction of wrong-view, but as a detached order of seeing, completely different from the attitude of holding to any view, wrong or right.

Inhalt

1. Introduction 2. The Content of Wrong-View 3. The Content of Right-View 4. The Way Wrong-View Functions 5. The Way Right-View Functions 6. The Transcendence of Views 7. Conclusion Appendices