The Origin of the Capitalist Firm

Explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship
Discusses why entrepreneurs monitor workers rather than workers monitoring entrepreneurs
Combines the contractual approach with the entrepreneurial approach to establish an entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm

Explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship Discusses why entrepreneurs monitor workers rather than workers monitoring entrepreneurs Combines the contractual approach with the entrepreneurial approach to establish an entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext
Weiying Zhang is the Sinar Mas Chair Professor of Economics National School of Development, Peking University. He received D. Phil in economics from Oxford. His research interests are industrial organization and theory of the firm; game and society; corporate governance; economic transition in China; law and economics; strategy and competitiveness and philosophy of economics. His published books including Game Theory and Information Economics, The Theory of the Firm and Chinese Enterprise Reform, The Logic of the Market: An Insider's View of Chinese Economic Reform, etc. all have great academic impact. His insightful and provocative opinions about China's reform have been widely reported both in China and in international media (such as WSJ, FT and NYT).

Zusammenfassung
Explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship
Discusses why entrepreneurs monitor workers rather than workers monitoring entrepreneurs
Combines the contractual approach with the entrepreneurial approach to establish an entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm

Inhalt
Preface to the second edition.- Preface to the first edition.- Acknowledgements.- Chapter 1 Introduction: Why Does Capital Hire Labour?.- Chapter 2 Marketing, Producing, Monitoring and the Assignment of Principalship.- Chapter 3 Marketing Ability, Personal Wealth and Capital-Hiring-Labour.- Chapter 4 A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Model of the Firm.- Chapter 5 Conclusions.- References.- Appendix 1: A Principal-agent Theory of Public Economy and Its Applications to China.- Appendix 2: Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How Chinese State-owned Enterprise Reform Works.