The Political Economy of International Tax Governance

Covering the period from the 1920s, when international tax policy was solely about avoiding double taxation, to the present era of international tax competition, Rixen investigates the fate of 'the power to tax' in an era of globalization, illustrating that tax sovereignty is both shaped and constrained by an international tax regime.

Autorentext

Political scientist and economist THOMAS RIXEN is currently a research fellow at the Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany. From 2003 to 2007 he was a research associate at the Collaborative Research Center, 'Transformations of the State', at Jacobs University Bremen. His research interests include (International) Political Economy, Public Finance and Institutional Theory.

Inhalt
Introduction PART I. INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE: THE ISSUES Research Question and Approach A Baseline Model of Tax Cooperation PART II. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD OF GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE The Institutional Setup of International Taxation Eradicating the 'Evils of Double Taxation' The Struggle against Under-Taxation PART III. EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND DEVELOPMENT Institutional Choice in the Avoidance of Double Taxation Institutional Development in the Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation Conclusion