The Politics of Agricultural Policies in Argentina and Brazil

How do powerful rural actors turn wealth into political cloutand when do they fail? This book offers a comparative account of business power that speaks to political scientists well beyond agricultural policy. Tracing Argentina and Brazil during the 2000s commodity boom, it shows how economic geography, federal institutions, and party systems combine to create (or block) institutionalized political resources: durable legislative footholds that let elites shape national policy even under redistributive governments. Using the soy sector as a strategic case, the book explains why Argentina imposed and sustained a 35% export tax, while in Brazil agrarian interests repeatedly vetoed or watered down regulation. The analysis blends multi-year fieldwork with original legislative and production data. Linking business power, territorial politics, and comparative institutions, the book qualifies resource-curse arguments by showing how commodity prices shocks' impacts are decisively mediated by domestic political dynamics.

it provides a novel argument on the power of agricultural elites in Latin America two largest agricultural exporters it provides a compelling argument on how political institutions mediate agricultural elites´ structural power it brings economic geography to bear into discussions of the power of agricultural elites

Autorentext

Carlos Freytes (Ph.D., Northwestern University) is Principal Researcher at the Argentine think tank Fundar's Natural Resources Program. He specializes in the comparative political economy of development, with a focus on the governance of natural resource-intensive sectors.

Inhalt

Chapter 1: The Politics of Booming Times: External Shocks and Mediating Domestic Political Dynamics in Latin America Export Agriculture.- Chapter 2: Geography, Federalism and Partisan Competition as Determinants of Agricultural Policy Choices in Argentina and Brazil.- Chapter 3: The Agricultural Sector's Political Muscle in Brazil: Peripheral Provinces, Partisan Fragmentation and Sectoral Interest Group's Cohesion.- Chapter 4: The Agricultural Sector's Political Resources in Argentina: Central Provinces, Partisan Discipline and Sectoral Interest Groups' Fragmentation.- Chapter 5: Agricultural Power in Motion: Negotiating Tax and Regulatory Policies in Argentina and Brazil.- Chapter 6: Conclusions.