The Rational and Natural Mind

The human mind presents itself as an object of study
which dovetails a rational and a physical nature.
Víctor M. Verdejo examines in this book both
dimensions of the mind by elucidating the
distinctive and common features of a genuinely
philosophical and a genuinely empirical approach.
The target philosophical theory, based upon
neo-Fregean developments, is the one that
constitutively appeals to the notion of rationality
and that works within what is called the Rationality
Framework (RF). The target empirical theory,
celebrated in cognitive science, is the Language of
Thought Hypothesis (LOT). At the heart of both
theories there is the assumption of realism about
mental states and the categories of folk psychology,
and they can be seen as providing (rationalist and
empirical) articulations of the view that
folk-psychological explanation is of a legitimate
kind. According to Verdejo's proposal, a correct
analysis of these theories ultimately shows the
possibility of a unifying picture of the mind, one in
which philosophical research on nonmechanical
rationality and empirical research on mechanical
mental processes go very much hand in hand.

Autorentext

Víctor M. Verdejo is a postdoctoral researcher and assistant professor ('professor associat') at UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) and associate member of LOGOS Research Group. His research interests are primarily in the philosophical and psychological approaches to concepts and the human mind.

Klappentext

The human mind presents itself as an object of study which dovetails a rational and a physical nature. Víctor M. Verdejo examines in this book both dimensions of the mind by elucidating the distinctive and common features of a genuinely philosophical and a genuinely empirical approach. The target philosophical theory, based uponneo-Fregean developments, is the one thatconstitutively appeals to the notion of rationalityand that works within what is called the RationalityFramework (RF). The target empirical theory,celebrated in cognitive science, is the Language ofThought Hypothesis (LOT). At the heart of boththeories there is the assumption of realism aboutmental states and the categories of folk psychology,and they can be seen as providing (rationalist and empirical) articulations of the view thatfolk-psychological explanation is of a legitimatekind. According to Verdejo's proposal, a correctanalysis of these theories ultimately shows thepossibility of a unifying picture of the mind, one inwhich philosophical research on nonmechanicalrationality and empirical research on mechanicalmental processes go very much hand in hand.