The Role of Organized Interest Groups in Policy Making

The book collects ten papers which give a broad overview of the most recent economic studies in the fields of lobbying and special interest groups. This field of research has been attracting a growing interest in economic literature. The papers in this volume are both theoretical and empirical and throw new light on the role of organized interest groups in a large range of political issues including electoral competition, public debt taxation, trade policy, social security, environmental polices and public spending.

Autorentext
KONSTANTIN BALTZ University of Konstanz, Germany CARL-JOHAN BELFRAGE Lund University, Sweden MORTEN BENNEDSEN Copenhagen Business School, CEBR and CIE, Denmark DANIEL BROU - MICHELE RUTA Columbia University, New York, USA LUCA DE BENEDICTIS Macerata University, Italy DANIELA FEDERICI Cassino University, Italy EMMA GALLI Rome University 'La Sapienza', Italy JULIEN A. HANOTEAU Groupe d'Economie Mondiale, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France ISABELLA IMPERATO Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Rome, Italy STEFANO MANZOCCHI Perugia University, Italy WOLFGANG MAYER University of Cincinnati, Ohio, USA SUDESH MUJUMDAR University of Southern Indiana, Evansville, Indiana, USA PIER CARLO PADOAN IMF, Washington and Rome University 'La Sapienza', Italy PAOLA PROFETA Pavia University and Bocconi University of Milan, Italy RICCARDO PUGSLI London School of Economics and Pavia University, Italy ROBERTO RICCIUTI Siena University, Italy FREDERIC ROBERT-NICOUD Genoa University, Italy FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria GERALD SCHNEIDER University of Konstanz, Germany CECILIA TESTA Royal Holloway University of London, UK HEINRICH W. URSPRUNG University of Konstanz, Germany

Inhalt
Introduction; D.Di Gioacchino, S.Ginebri & L.Sabani PART I: PRE-ELECTION POLITICS Lobbying and Political Polarization; H.W.Ursprung Comment; F.Schneider Vote Buying Through Resource Allocation in a Government Controlled Sector; M.Bennedsen Comment; R.Puglisi The Political Power of the Owners of Public Debt; D.Di Gioacchino, S.Ginebri & L.Sabani Comment; P.C.Padoan PART II: POST-ELECTION POLITICS Endogenous Lobbying in Search of Import Protection; W.Mayer & S.Mujumdar Comment; F.Robert-Nicoud Ageing and Lobbying: Implications for Social Security; P.Profeta Comment; C.Testa Lobbying, Bargaining and EU Enlargement; D.Brou & M.Ruta Comment; S.Manzocchi Trade Policy with Intermediate Uses of Goods; C-J.Belfrage Comment; L.De Benedictis PART III: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON LOBBYING The Power of Specialization: How Interest Groups Influence EU Legislation; G.Schneider & K.Baltz Comment; I.Imperato Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program; J.A.Hanoteau Comment; D.Federici Trading Interests: Legislature Size, Constituency Size and Government Spending in a Panel of Countries; R.Ricciuti Comment; E.Galli