Value Capture in Disintegrated Value Chains

Using cooperative game theory, this book shows how bargaining structure affects the distribution of value among the constituent firms of the value chain. Results show that positions in the bargaining structure most conducive to value capture are those where large complementarity gains are realized and split, ideally, among a small number of negotiators. Further, leveraging case studies from the aviation and home appliance industries the author suggests that the bargaining structure can be shaped through by architecture of the value chain and, in turn, through the architecture of the product, and the action of powerful firms to optimize value capture.

Study in the field of economics Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext

Alexander Hoffmann is a researcher in the field of technology and innovation management at the TU München, Germany, and a management consultant.

Inhalt
Determinants of value capture.- Bargaining structure.- Modeling the effect of bargaining structure on value capture.- Drivers of bargaining structure and empirical implications of the hierarchy strategy.