Welfare Economics and Antitrust Policy - Vol. II

This book is Volume II of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various kinds of antitrust-policy-coverable conduct and various possible government responses to such conduct, including US and EU antitrust law.

The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of their economic efficiency, their impact on liberal moral rights, and their instantiation of various utilitarian and other egalitarian conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law and compares the extent to whichwhen correctly interpreted and appliedthese two bodies of law could increase economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good.

This second volume contains the last 6 chapters of Part II, which focus respectively on horizontal (M&A)s, conglomerate (M&A)s, surrogates for vertical integration, vertical (M&A)s, joint ventures, and internal growth and Part III, which focuses on US antitrust law and EU competition law. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust policy, and The General Theory of Second Best.

Analyzes the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various tests of antitrust legality Analyzes the business functions and competitive impact of antitrust-law-covered conduct Takes appropriate account of the General Theory of Second Best

Autorentext

Richard Markovits has a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics and an L.L.B. from Yale Law School (USA). His research covers competition theory, pricing theory, the theory of vertical integration and its contractual surrogates, economics and the interpretation and application of US and EU antitrust law, the definition and moral and legal relevance of the impact of a choice on economic efficiency, second-best theory (the third-best-economically-efficient protocol for analyzing economic efficiency), the economic efficiency of various specific judicial doctrines and pieces of legislation, jurisprudence, constitutional law, and the abstract definition and concrete moral and legal entailments of liberalism. He currently holds the John B. Connally Chair in Law at the University of Texas Law School (Austin, USA). He has taught in several other law schools and economics faculties in both the United States and Germany. From 1981-1983, he was Co-Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Wolfson College, Oxford. He has been a Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin and a Guddenhein Fellow, has served on panels of the US National Science Foundation and the UK Social Science Research Council, and has been a Trustee of the Law & Society Association.

Inhalt
Part II (Cont'd): The Morally-Relevant Effects of Specific Categories of Antitrust-Policy-Coverable Conduct and the Ability of Government to Secure Better Outcomes.- Part III: The Economic Efficiency, Liberal Justness, and Non-Liberal-Egalitarian Moral Desirability of U.S. Antitrust Law and E.U. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted and Applied as a Matter of Law.