Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Each essay in this volume discusses some prevalent views in contemporary philosophy of mind by confronting them with Wittgensteinian ideas. Part One addresses the views of Quine and Dennett, including functionalism, eliminative materialism and the current debate about consciousness. Part Two assembles essays that focus each on one particular psychological concept, namely thinking, imagining, sensation, knowledge and reason.

Autorentext
ROBERT L. ARRINGTON Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta STEWART CANDLISH Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Western Australia, Perth HANS-JOHANN GLOCK Reader in Philosophy, University of Reading P.M.S. HACKER Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St John's College, Oxford OSWALD HANFLING Professor of Philosophy, Open University EDWARD HARCOURT Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury MICHEL TER HARK Professor, History of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands JOHN HYMAN Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, The Queen's College, Oxford ROGER TEICHMANN Lecturer in Philosophy, St Hilda's College, Oxford.

Inhalt
Preface Abbreviations Notes on the Contributors PART I: CONCEPTIONS OF THE MIND Wittgenstein and Quine: Mind, Language and Behaviour; H.J.Glock The Functionalist's Inner State; R.Teichmann Consciousness: 'The Last Mystery'; O.Hanfling Eliminative Materialism; P.M.S.Hacker Wittgenstein and Dennett on Patterns; M.T.Hark PART II: SOME MENTAL CONCEPTS Mental Imagery; S.Candlish Thought and its Expression; R.L.Arrington Are Reasons Causes? A Wittgenstein Response to Davidson; S.Schroeder Knowledge and Self-knowledge; J.Hyman Wittgenstein and 'the Whereabouts of Pain'; E.Harcourt Bibliography Index