Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy

Leading scholars discuss whether some of the main tenets or theses that are currently or traditionally ascribed to Wittgenstein are still both theoretically and exegetically viable, by focusing on three well-established Wittgensteinian themes: mind, meaning, and metaphilosophy.

Autorentext
WILLIAM CHILD is Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Oxford, UK PASQUALE FRASCOLLA is Professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Basilicata, Italy HANS-JOHANN GLOCK is Chair in Philosophy at University of Zurich, and is currently President, Philosophical Society Zurich Switzerland PAUL HORWICH is Professor of Philosophy, New York University, USA SIR ANTHONY KENNY (retired) University of Oxford, UK DIEGO MARCONI teaches Philosophy of Language at the University of Torino, Italy KEVIN MULLIGAN, Professor of Analytic Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland EVA PICARDI is Professor of Philosophy of Language, University of Bologna, Italy. She is also Director of the Doctoral Programme 'Mind, Logic, and Language' JOACHIM SCHULTE teaches at University of Zurich, Switzerland FREDERICK STOUTLAND is Permanent Visiting Professor, University of Uppsala, Sweden ALBERTO VOLTOLINI is a Philosopher of Language and Mind, and is Associate Professor at the University of Turin, Italy MEREDITH WILLIAMS is Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, USA TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, is Wykeham Professor of Logic, New College, Oxford, UK

Inhalt
Notes on Contributors Introduction; P.Frascolla , D.Marconi & A.Voltolini PART I: MIND Rule and Exception in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind; W.Child Reading-machines, Feelings of Influence, Experiences of Being Guided: Wittgenstein on Reading; J.Schulte Reasons and Causes; F.Stoutland Was Wittgenstein Wrong about Intentionality?; A.Voltolini PART II: MEANING Does Language Require Conventions?; H-J.Glock Regularities, Rules, Meanings, Truth Conditions, and Epistemic Norms; P.Horwich Wittgenstein and Necessary Facts; D.Marconi Wittgenstein and Frege on Proper Names and the Context Principle; E.Picardi Sceptical Conclusions about Epistemological Analyticity; T.Williamson PART III: METAPHILOSOPHY An Adequacy Condition for the Interpretation of the Tractatus Ontology; P.Frascolla Method and Metaphilosophy in the Philosophical Investigations; M.Williams Farewell Thoughts on Wittgenstein; A.Kenny Index